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LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
IN THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS EFFECT
ON OFFICIAL STATUST
By

T

OLIVER

P

FIELD*

effect of an unconstitutional statute becomes of importance at two points in the law of public officers (1) in connection with official status, relating largely to the doctrines concerning de facto officers, (2) in connection with the liability of
officers for action or nonaction under an invalid statute. The
first of these points of contact between the two fields will be the
subject of this study'
Three situations may arise with respect to the invalidity of a
statute, in the law of public officers. First, the statute creating
an office may be defective. Second, the statute creating the office
may be valid, but the law providing for filling it may be unconstitutional. Thzrd, the statutes creating, as well as providing for
the filling of an office may be valid, but the statute authorizing the
officer to perform some particular function may be invalid. The
first and second of these situations will be considered in the treatment of official status.
I
HE

ATTACK BY PERSONS IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY

1. Quo Warranto by the Attorney General or sonic Official
Representative of the State.-The rule is well settled that the
attorney general may file an information in the nature of quo
warranto and thus institute proceedings to test the constitutionality
of the statute under which an incumbent claims to hold an office.
Thus, it has been held that an officer appointed by the governor
when he should have been elected by the people, the statute having
prescribed the former mode of filling the office, may be ejected
from office by a judgment of ouster in quo warranto proceedings.2
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
tThis is one of a series of articles on the effect of an unconstitutional statute written as a Sterling Fellow, Yale University School
of Law, under the direction of Professor Walter F Dodd. The writer
is also indebted to Professor Edwin M. Borchard for suggestions as
to the form and content of this study.
'The second of these problems is the subject of an article ti 77
Univ.2 of Pa. L. Rev. 155.
People v. Raymond, (1868) 37 N. Y 428.
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This is true whether the statute creating the office itself is unconstitutional,' or whether the statute providing the method of
filling the office is invalid. 4 An officer not possessed of the constitutional qualifications for an office may be ousted by quo warranto proceedings, and this although no person is waiting, ready
to take over the duties of the office at the time.'
Quo warranto will lie against an officer on the ground that
the statute creating the office is unconstitutional even though the
existence of a municipality is involved in the same proceeding.0
This also applies to a case involving annexation of territory to a
municipality by virtue of an invalid statute, the judgment in such
a case being that the officer be ousted from office, or that the city
power over the
be ousted from exercising any governmental
7
territory unconstitutionally annexed.
Where the existence of a municipality is questioned the
court is likely to be more slow to declare the statute unconstitutional than if the existence of the office, or the validity of
the method of filling the office, alone is at stake. The tendency
of the courts to preserve the legal status of governmental units
8
is well illustrated by the case of State ex rel. Strrmple v. McBride
in which one of the circuit courts of Ohio held that the state
was barred from assailing the existence of a municipality by proceedings instituted by a prosecuting attorney on behalf of the
state, because the statute of limitations had run against the action.
The statute contained no reference to the state, but was a typical
statute preventing attack on the corporate existence of the inunicipality after the lapse of a specified number of years. The court
interpreted the statute to be as effective against attack by the state
through quo warranto as against attack by an individual.
3
People ex rel. Bolt v. Riordan, (1889) 73 Mich. 508, 41 N. W
482; People ex rel. Longnecker v. Nelson, (1890) 133 fi1. 565, 27
N. E. 217 quo warranto by attorney .for the state, statute held constitutional.
4State ex rel. Loucks v. Bradshaw, (1893) 56 N. J. L. 1, 27 At
939. 5
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Gleason, (1868) 12 Fla. 190
ouster against lieutenant governor, State ex rel. Attorney General v
Porter, (1840) 1 Ala. 388, disqualification case, but incumbent resigned
judgment of ouster could be given, so withheld.
before
6
State ex rel. O'Sullivan v. Coffey, (1875) 59 Mo. 59. See for additional illustrations of this topic, as well as that involved in the
cases in note 7 Field, The Status of a Municipal Corporation Organized Under An Unconstitutional Statute, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 523.
Attorney General v. Crane, (1886) 60 Mich. 373; State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Cincinnati, (1870) 20 Oh. St. 18; Same v. Cincinnati, (1895) 52 Oh. St. 419, 40 N. E 508.
8(1897) 7 Oh. Cir. Dec. 522.
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The proceedings by the state must, however, be directed against
the officer whose title to the office is in question, and the attorney
general will not be permitted, under the guise of quo warranto
against officer X to test the title of officer Y, even though Y appointed X to the office, and Y is alleged to hold office by virtue
of an invalid statute.9
The officer whose title is being assailed will be permitted
to perform the fuictions of the office pending the outcome of
the proceedings, and the court will refuse to grant an injunction
forbidding him to perform his official functions, on the theory that
his acts will nevertheless be valid as to third persons, and also,
on the ground that quo warranto is not intended to paralyze the
business of government, but is designed to oust persons from
offices to wuch they are not legally entitled. 10
The fact that nobody stands ready to carry on the functions
of an office is, as previously indicated, not a sufficient reason for
declining to give a judgment of ouster. The court may, however,
in such a case delay the execution of the judgment in order that
provision may be made for carrying on the work connected with a
particular office or group of offices. An Ohio case illustrates the
discretion possessed by courts in this matter, the court there
granting a stay of three months in which the executive and legislative authorities might provide for the government of cities of the
class of Cleveland, the ouster in the case being against the members of what was virtually the governing board of the city "I
The de facto doctrine has no application to cases in which
an official representative of the state challenges title to an office on
the ground of unconstitutionality, that doctrine being reserved for
cases in which title is challenged by private parties acting in their
own behalf, or, in some cases, acting as voluntary representatives
of the state in asking a court to permit the filing of an information
of quo warranto in the name of the state. The state may always
assail the validity of a statute creating an office or providing the
method whereby incumbents are to be placed therein, subject only
to such restrictions as the state may have imposed upon itself
by means of statutes of limitations. The state has an interest
9
Attorney General ex rel. Fuller v. Parsell, (1894) 99 Mich. 381,
58 N. W 335.
loPeople ex reL Wood v. Draper, (1857) 24 Barb. (N.Y.) 265.
"'State ex rel. Attorney General v. Beacom, (1902) 66 Oh. St. 457
64 N. E. 427
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in ousting from office all persons claiming title thereto if such
claims are not founded on valid statutes.
2. Contests between Rival Claimants to an Office.-It not
infrequently happens that two or more persons claim title to the
same office. In such a case the party not in possession of the
office may proceed (a) by asking the court for permission to file
an information in the nature of quo warranto in the name of
the state, seeking thereby to oust the present incumbent of the
office, or (b) by asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding the incumbent to deliver to the petitioner the books,
papers, and possession of the office. If, on the other hand, tile
incumbent wishes to take the initiative he may ask that an mjunction be issued forbidding the rival claimant from taking any steps
to obtain the office. The use of mandamus and injunction to
try title to office is in many states narrowly restricted, but in
some states they are available to test title when an unconstitutional
statute is involved.
(a) Permission has been granted in a number of cases to
file an information in the nature of quo warranto in order that
the conflicting claims of persons asserting a right to hold an
office may be determined. If, in such a case, the statute creating
the office which the defendant holds is unconstitutional a judgment of ouster will be granted.' 2 The same result will follow
if the statute providing the method for filling the office is invalid.Y
Where two persons claim to be the rightful holders of a judgeship,
each claiming office under separate statutes, an information in
the nature of quo warranto by one of the claimants is a proper
method whereby to test the validity of the statute under which
defendant asserts title."' One Ohio case takes a position contrary
to that just stated, holding that an official representative of the
state alone can try title in quo warranto proceedings."
In McCall v Webb 1" the defendant was permitted to deny
the legality of his own office on the ground that if the statute
creating the office was invalid plaintiff could not ask the defendant
a2Commonwealth ex rel. Hite v. Swank, (1875) 79 Pa. St. 154
State13 ex rel. Reemelin v. Smith, (1891) 48 Oh. St. 211, 26 N. E. 1069
Longshore v. State ex rel. Kroell, (1917) 200 Ala. 267 76 So.
33- State ex rel. Richards v. Hammer, (1880) 42 N. J. L. 435" State
ex rel.
Smallwood v. Windom, (1915) 131 Minn. 401, 155 N. W 629
4
1 People ex rel. Ballou v. Bangs, (1860) 24 T11. 184.
"5State ex rel. Heer v Butterfield, (1915) 92 Oh. St. 428, 111 N. E.
279.
16(1899) 125 N. C. 243, 34 S.E. 430.
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be ousted from it, nor could he demand possession of a nonexistent office.
A type of case not strictly within the scope of this section,
but sufficiently analogous to warrant consideration at this point,
is that in which one officer attempts to obtain the ouster of the
holder of another office. For example, in Hinze v. People ex rel.
Halbert" the mayor of a city filed a petition seeking the removal
from office of a police commissioner because of the alleged unconstitutionality of the statute creating the office. A judgment
of ouster was rendered. State v. Butler' s presented a somewhat
similar situation. In that case a county attorney filed an information to test the warrant whereby a special prosecutor for
liquor cases held office. The statute creating the office of special
prosecutor was declared invalid and ouster granted. In both
of these cases the controversy partook of the nature of a private
dispute between officials. In neither of them did the relator
act as the official representative of the state in the same manner
as the attorney general does in quo warranto cases. The form
of the action was that of quo warranto, but the moving force
in the entire proceeding was the resentment of one official against
attempts to encroach upon the functions of his office by the creation of a new office.
Sometimes disputes arise between persons admittedly the
rightful holders of their respective offices as to the functions to
be performed by each of them. If a statute conferring the performance of given functions on one of the officers is unconstitutional he may, at the relation of the holder of another office

claiming the power to perform the functions in question, be ousted
in quo warranto proceedings, from the exercise of the particular
duties in dispute. 9 The controversy in such a case is not over
title to office but rather as to the function to be performed by
the particular officer.
It is clear from the foregoing cases that the courts are quite
ready to permit the use of quo warranto by one of two persons
claiming title to an office, or asserting that the defendant is performing functions which rightfully appertain to the petitioner's
office.
(b) Incumbents of existing offices are sometimes unwilling
to surrender the books and papers of the office to their successors,
17(1879) 92 Ill. 406.
28(1909) 105 Me. 91, 73 Atd. 500.
19People ex rel. Ryerson v. Kelsey, (1868) 34 Cal. 470.
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or to persons asserting that they hold an office which supersedes
the one in which the former is situated. In such a case mandamus may be invoked to compel the surrender of the books in
dispute. If the defendant succeeds in his attack on the validity
of the statute creating the office to which the petitioner lays claim,
or if the statute changing the method of selecting incumbents
to the office is invalid, the petition will be denied. "If the law
under which he claims is unconstitutional, he has no standing."20
In Matter of Brenner21 it was held that the old officer could defend against a suit to obtain the books and papers of the office by
showing that the certificate of the claimant had been granted in
accordance with an invalid statute. The court said, in this case,
that the petitioner must, in order to succeed in such a suit, show a
good title to the office.
This rule, that plaintiff in a suit to obtain possession of an
office must, in order to succeed, show a good title to it, is well
established. It is not sufficient that defendant's title is defective.
In passing upon the claim to an office the court may consider
the validity of acts performed by other officers than those directly
2
involved in the suit. To illustrate, in Pratt v. BreckenrndgeN
the plaintiff offered as evidence of his title a certificate of election issued by a board of election commissioners. The defendant
assailed the validity of the statute creating the board, and the
court sustained his position. The board having been created by
an invalid law it followed that the certificate issued to plaintiff
did not constitute prima facie evidence of title. Therefore,
plaintiff failed to establish his case and defendant was left in
possession of the office, although in this case he held it by virtue
of a prior decision of this same board, the board having later
reversed its decision in a contested election, giving to the plaintiff
the certificate of election. This indirect method of assailing the
validity of the statute creating the board is at variance with the
rule forbidding such attack, in quo warranto cases.23
20
Fillimore v. Van Horn, (1901) 129 Mich. 56, 88 N. W 69" State
ex rel. Kinsley v. Jones, (1902) 66 Oh. St. 453, 64 N. E. 424.
21(1902) 170 N. W 185, 63 N. E. 118. In Davidson v Hine, (1908)
151 Mich. 294, 115 N. W 246, mandamus was denied in a petition to
compel defendants to turn over the fire and police records to the petitioner, the latter claiming to be members of a bureau of public safety.
The statute creating the bureau was declared invalid.
22(1901) 112 Ky 1, 65 S. W 136.
On contesting an election, see
Adsit v. Ozmun, (1891) 84 Mich. 420, 48 N. W 21, mandamus to compel counting
of votes, petitioner claiming to have been elected.
2
3See ex rel. Herron v. Smith, (1886) 44 Oh. St. 348, where relator,
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The case of People ex rel. Stuckhart v. KnopJfi presented the
question whether the old assessor could defend against a petition
for a mandamus compelling him to surrender books and papers
to a person claiming to be a newly elected assessor, by showing
that he had already delivered the books to another person, believed by him to be the rightful holder of the new office which
was thought to have superseded that of assessor. The petition
was demed because the statute creating the new office was sustained. What the result would have been had the law been held
invalid is difficult to know.
The constitutionality of a statute conferring upon the governor the power to fill an office by appointment may be challenged
by the person entrusted with the function of approving the official
bond of the appointee.- 5 In such a case the petition for mandamus to compel the approval will be denied if the statute is
declared unconstitutional. This type of case does not involve a
dispute between rivals for an office, but illustrates that an officer
may justify the refusal to perform an act upon the ground that it
is thrust upon him by an invalid statute,2 and also that title
to office may be challenged by officers made defendants in manclaiming membership on a board superseded by a newly created office,
sought in quo warranto to oust members of the new board because
some of the members of the state senate voting for the statute creating the new board were not de jure members of the senate. The
court held that the members in question were at least de facto
senators, and therefore refused to grant ouster. See also, supra,
note 8.
On the status of members of the state legislature,
see the discussion in Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, (1892) 133
Ind. 178, 32 N. E. 836 and Sherrill v. O'Brien, (1907) 188 N. Y
185, 81 N. E. 124. In the case last cited the court said, concerning
the effect of an unconstitutional statute: "An act of the legislature,
if invalid, as violating the constitution, is invalid from the time of
its enactment, not merely from the declaration of its character by the
courts. But though the appointment or election of a public officer
may be illegal, it is elementary law that his official acts while lie is
an actual incumbent of the office are valid and binding on the public
and on third parties." 188 N. Y at 212. The court said that admission by one of the houses of the legislature constituted a member a
de jure member, because the houses of the legislature were judges
of their own elections.
24(1900) 183 IlL. 410, 56 N. E. 155.
25
State ex rel. Geake v. Fox, (1901) 158 Ind. 126, 56 N. E. 893.
2
GThis is not the rule when prcperty rights are affected by the
refusal of an officer to take action enjoined upon him unless the statute turns out to be invalid when brought to a test. See for a consideration of this problem, Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute in the Law of Public Officers: Liability for Official Action and
Nonaction, 77 Umv. of Pa. L. Rev. 155.
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damus proceedings which seek to compel recognition by them
of the petitioner's title.
The courts of some states will not interfere by mandamus
in disputes between subordinates and superior officers in which
subordinates challenge the validity of acts performed by superiors
on the ground that authority to perform them is derived from
an invalid statute. The much cited case of Lang v The Mayor
of Bayonne27 involved this point. In that case a police officer
had been removed from the city police force by a newly created
board of police commissioners. The policeman petitioned for
a writ of mandamus to compel his restoration to the force by the
mayor, alleging in his petition that inasmuch as the statute creating
the office of police commissioner was unconstitutional the control
of the force was, as it had been prior to the pretended enactment
of the statute in question, still in the hands of the mayor The
petition was denied on the ground that the commissioners were
de facto officers and that as to the public, including petitioner,
their acts were binding. A similar decision is that of Carland v.
Commissioners of Custer County,28 collateral attack being denied
in that case to an officer who had been removed by the board
of commissioners, the claim being, upon the part of the appellant,
that the statute creating and filling the office of commissioner was
unconstitutional.
(c) Injunction may be resorted to by the present holder of
an office to prevent persons elected to a new office established by
an unconstitutional statute, from assuming to perform the functions of the new office.29 In the majority of cases however the
initiative is taken by the new officer by means of quo warranto
or mandamus, and in only a few cases has the old officer sought
equitable relief against threatened intrusion into office, or against
the establishment of a new office threatening to supersede an old
30
one.
27(1906) 74 N. J. L. 455, 63 At. 270, 68 Atl. 90. Cf. Connon.
wealth v. McCombs, (1867) 56 Pa. St. 436, dispute between district
attorney and his assistant.
28(1885) 5 Mont. 579, 6 Pac. 24. See State ex rel. Sipp v. Stroble,
Oh. Cir. Ct. 762.
(1904)
2 25
9Malone v. Williams, (1907) 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S. W 798.
0
3 Watson v. McGrath, (1904) 111 La. 1097 36 So. 204. In this
case the injunction was dented because the statute was held constitutional.

Relative to the effect of an invalid statute the court said, at

p. 1098: "A statute may be constitutional only in part. or with regard

to certain persons or things, or up to a certain point of its operation,
and in other respects unconstitutional. The rule is to let it have opera-

tion within the scope of its constitutionality

if the legislative iitent
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In summary of the cases reviewed in this section it may be
said that the courts are quite lenient in permitting the constitutionality of statutes purporting to create an office or to provide
a method of filling it, to be raised in contests between rival
claimants, or between the holders of two different offices. This
leniency does not extend to cases in which inferior officers attempt to dispute the constitutional basis of their superiors' position.

With the exception of this last group of cases the courts
do not apply the de facto doctrine in these contests. There are
dicta to be found in many of the cases reviewed in this section,
which state that the acts of officers selected in accordance with
an unconstitutional statute are valid as to the public. Attack
being permitted under the circumstances presented in these cases
renders such statements unnecessary, and they are for that reason
to be regarded as dicta and nothing more. Some of them are in
accord with the decision of the Long Case, holding that there may
be a de facto officer even though the office which he purports to
hold is created by an unconstitutional statute.
II
ATTACK BY PERSONS ACTING IN AN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Thus far cases have been considered in which officers acting
on behalf of the state, or acting in their official capacity to protect
their own office, or persons claiming to be rightful holders of
an office, have challenged by quo warranto, mandamus, or injunction the constitutional basis of some other officer or office.
The next problem to be considered is In what cases may a
private citizen acting in his own behalf, or seeking to act, of his
own volition, in the name of the state, challenge the title of an
officer ?
1. Quo Warranto.-In the absence of statute private citizens
will usually not be permitted to file an information in the nature
of quo warranto, and statutes permitting this are not common,
although they are to be found in some of the states.3 1 Some
to that effect is clear and unmistakable." And again, "Because the
Legislature desired that this appointee should have the office during
the whole unexpired term, and so provided, is no reason for deny-

ing to him the right to hold it at least for the term which the legislature
had clear constitutional authority to give it to him."
31
State of Nevada ex rel. Fletcher v. Osburn, (1893) 24 Ney.
187, 51 Pac. 837

In Darrow v. People, (1885) 8 Col. 417 the statute
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states by statute permit individual voters to contest the election of
32
a candidate to office.
2. Tax Cases.-(a) Taxpayers will often succeed in testing by injunction the constitutionality of a statute authorizing the
levy of a tax,"3 but if the collection of a tax is sought to be
restrained on the ground that the officer levying the tax, or collecting it, holds office by virtue of an invalid statute the court is
likely to make use of the de facto doctrine to defeat him.'
Here,
as in the cases involving the corporate existence of a municipal
corporation, public policy should cause the courts to utilize the
de facto doctrine to uphold the validity of an officer's status
if the statutes authorizing the tax are constitutional, and if the
office is one which could have been created under the constitution. The taxpayer should not be allowed to escape his share
of the burden of supporting the financial structure of the government just because one of the officers engaged in the administration of the tax laws holds office by appointment, when for
example he should have been chosen by popular election, the
legislature having mistaken the rule of constitutional law on the
point. If the activity is one which could otherwise have been
authorized, so that the taxpayer will in the long run be compelled
to contribute to its support anyway, the fact that the officer's title
is defective should not be sufficient to permit him to disrupt the
financial administration of the particular governmental unit that
may be involved. Particularly should this be the case if injunctive
relief is not sought immediately upon the taking of office by
someone not entitled thereto, or immediately upon the attempt
to exercise the functions of an office created by an unconstitutional statute. 35
was held constitutional, but the court proceeded to consider the merits
of the case which was instituted by a petition by a taxpayer for permission to file an information in the nature of quo warranto. Mo.
Rev. Stat. 1919, sec. 2066 (providing that an information of quo
warranto may be filed by the attorney general or prosecuting attorney
"at the relation of any person desiring to prosecute the same.")
32
See for example, Brown v. Smallwood, (1915) 130 Minn. 492,
153 N. W 953.
33C. B. U. P v. Smith, (1880) 23 Kan. 745" Snider v. Jackson
County, (1918) 175 N. C. 590, 96 S. E. 32; Hickman v. Kimbley, (1914)
161 Ky.
652, 171 S. W 176.
34
Smith v. Lynch, (1876) 29 Oh. St. 261. Cf. Roche v. Jones,
(1891) 87 Va. 484, 12 S. E. 965. The cases in which the existence of a municipality is involved, as well as the existence of an office, are conflicting. See Field, The Status of a Municipal Corporation Organized Under
an Unconstitutional Statute, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 523.
35
Ayeridge v. Town Commissioners of Social Circle, (1878) 60
Ga. 404.
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In Clucago & Northwestern Ry. v. Langlade County3 " an action was brought by the railway company to set aside a tax levy
because the statute under which the county had been organized
was invalid. For this reason, it was argued, the officers of the
county had not even a de facto status, and consequently no obligation to pay the tax rested upon the company The statute was
held to be constitutional but the court said that if it had been
unconstitutional the county officers would nevertheless have been
de facto officers, and as such their acts would have been valid as
to the railway company. While it is true that in this case the
court had the added weight of the argument supporting de facto
municipal corporations under such circumstances, there is no
reason why the same rule should not be applied in cases where
the existence of an office, or the validity of the statute providing
for choosing its incumbents, is questioned on the ground of unconstitutionality, the existence of a municipal unit not being
involved.
(b) May a taxpayer resist an action by the tax collector
or mumcipality on the ground that the board or officer levying
the tax occupied an office created by an invalid statute, or, the
office being validly created, chosen to fill it in accordance with a
statute suffering from a similar defect?
State ex ret. City of St. Paul v. District Court of Ramsey
County37 presented a case in which two boards attempted to carry
on the same functions at the same time. One of them was dedared without authority and its members ousted from office.
Subsequent to the ouster of the members of the board which had
been created by an unconstitutional act the city brought an action
to enforce payment of an assessment for local improvements made
under the direction and orders of this board. The defense was
that the law creating the office being unconstitutional there could
be no office to fill, because the de facto doctrine applies to officers
and not to offices. The court supported this contention, deciding
that the assessments in question should be set aside. The court
stressed the fact that the object of the statute was an unconstitutional one, that the defect was not one of form, but of substance, and observed that for that reason it was "as inoperative
as if it had never been passed." The earlier case of Burt v. Winona & St. Peter R. R. Co.,38 to be discussed in detail in another
38(1883) 56 Wis. 614, 14 N. W 844.
37(1898) 72 Minn. 226, 75 N. W 224.
38(1884) 31 Minn. 472, 18 N. W 283.
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section, 9 was both limited and distinguished limited to its particular facts, involving in a civil case the constitutionality of an
act establishing a municipal court, the act not having received the
requisite number of votes in the upper house of the legislature,
distinguished because of the fact that the object of the statute
in the Burt Case was constitutional, for the legislature had power
to establish municipal courts, while the object of the statute
in the Ramsey County case was a prohibited one, depending upon
substance instead of form or procedure. The Ramsey County
case could have been disposed of, and distinguished from the
Burt Case, by invoking the doctrine that there cannot be a de
facto officer where there is a de jure one in existence.4" There
were, in the Burt Case, two boards, each contesting with the
other for power. It is questionable, however, whether the taxpayers should be encouraged by the courts to resist payment of
assessments under these circumstances and at this stage of the
proceedings. They were on notice, doubtless, of the contest between the two boards, and they should not be permitted to sit
by and accept without protest improvements for their benefit
and for which they would normally have to pay, when they could
by injunction have protected themselves from illegal acts on the
part of either or both of the boards. Would it not have been
more just, under the circumstances of the Ramsey County case,
to have said that the acts of the boards in question, in so far as
those done by order of the one later ousted from its functions
were not in conflict with those of the board subsequently declared
to be the legal body, were binding on the lot owners in question?
If the court wished to hold that the statute permitting the assessments and the work to be done was unconstitutional it should
have made that clear, for a justifiable case might well have been
made out on that score, but it should not have decided the case
on the basis of the de facto doctrine, if that was the objection
advanced. Whether or not X should pay for the paving of a
street in front of his lot should not depend upon the de facto or
non de facto status of an officer or board, irrespective of what
might be the rule in case the statute authorizing the work to be
done was unconstitutional.
Two Illinois cases hold that an action to collect a tax may
not be successfully resisted if the objection advanced in defence
section 6a.
39Infra
40Dienstag v Fagan, (1907) 74 N. J. L. 418, 65 AtI. 1011.
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is that the officers involved were chosen in accordance with an
invalid law 41 In one of them the court said -4
"There are present, here, all the elements which, from considerations of public policy and for the avoiding of public inconvemence, have been recognized as going to make up the character
of de facto officers, whose acts should be held valid,-as officers,
by virtue of an election as such, under an act of the legislature,
reputation of being public officers and public belief of their being
such, public recognition thereof, and public acquiescence therein,
and action as such unquestioned during a series of years, with no
other body ready and willing to act as the board of supervisors."
They had color of title, said the court, although the statute was
defective. On grounds of policy this should be the rule whether
the office was created by an invalid statute or whether the officer
was chosen to fill the office under a defective statute. The reasons for applying the de facto doctrine in the one case apply with
equal force to the other.
3. Eminent Doniam.-A property owner whose property
is about to be taken from him by public authorities may prevent
immediate seizure of the same by obtaining an injunction, and may
thus raise the question of the constitutionality of a law creating
the office which the authorities pretend to occupy 3 If the
statute is declared unconstitutional
"It results that the defendants are doing acts affecting the
plaintiff's rights that they have no authority of law to do, because
there is44no such office, the duties of which they claim to be exercising.1

Suppose however, that the officers of the municipality take
possession of the property of a private citizen, thinking that they
have the power to do so under the power of eminent domain
possessed by the city? May the owner recover back the land
taken from him, asserting that although the city had the power
of eminent domain the officers who sought to act for the city in
41

Leach v. People ex rel. Patterson, (1887) 122 Ill.
420, 12 N. E.
726; Samuels v. Drainage Commissioners, (1888) 125 Ill.536, 17
N. E. 829.
42Leach v. People ex rel. Patterson, (1887) 122 Il1. 420, 430. 12
N. E. 726. In Town of Decorah v. Bullis, (1868) 25 Ia. 12, the town
sued in its corporate capacity to recover an assessment. The town
officers enacting the sidewalk ordinance were elected to office under a statute which the court held inapplicable to this town, although
the statute was constitutional. Held, the officers were not de facto
and judgment
for the defendant.
43 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Claypool, (1897) 149 Ind. 193, 48
N. E.
4 228.
4ndianapolis Brewing Co. v. Claypool, (1897) 149 Ind. 193, 205,
48 N. E. 228.
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the particular proceeding purported to be the incumbents of
non-existing offices, the law creating them being invalid? This
was the situation presented in Nichols v. City of Cleveland.45
In answer to the contention of counsel that the constitutionality
of the statutes creating the offices in question could not be raised
in such a case because the officers enjoyed a de facto status, and
that their acts could therefore not be assailed, the United States
circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit said .41
"This is to assert that the owner of private property may
not dispute the claimed right of a municipal board to exercise
the power of eminent domain. It needs no citation of authority
to show that the rightful investment of such power is essential
to the taking of private property in invitum. It would be a strange,
and certainly an arbitrary rule that would forbid an owner to
protect his property rights through challenge of the constitutional
validity of the only statute relied on to justify the exercise of
such a power as that of eminent domain."
The city contended, however, that inasmuch as it had possession
of the property and inasmuch as a later statute had given the city
the power to take property in this type of case, it should be permitted to retain the property upon making proper compensation
to the owner. The court asserted, on this point, that title remained in the owner all the time, despite the possession of the
city, but in view of the many years that had passed, and in view
of the subsequent grant of authority to the city, a conditional
judgment would be given, giving the city the privilege of instituting new condemnation proceedings to acquire the property
Allowance was made in computing the amount of the judgment,
for rent, profits, and issues, compensation thus being made to the
owner for the period during which he had been deprived of possession.
The distinction between the Nichols Case, where recovery of
property which has been taken from one is asked, and the case
where injunctive relief is asked against threatened taking, is an
important one, fully justifying the different result reached in
the two cases. Under the circumstances of the Nichols Case it
would have been of little avail to have allowed the recovery of
the land in question because the city could have regained possession of it upon the institution of condemnation proceedings.
In King v. Philadelphia County 7 a bill was filed to restrain
the county from maintaining gas pipes in a street which had
45(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1917) 247 Fed. 731.
46Nichols v. Cleveland (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1917) 247 Fed. 731, 739.
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been opened through the plaintiff's land. The board of viewers
provided for by statute in assessment and street opening proceedings -was assailed, the statute being attacked as unconstitutional. The pipes had been laid for two or more years, and the
street had been opened to traffic. The bill was dismissed, the
court saying that it would be impracticable at that late date to
tear up the pipes and undo the work that had been done. "Such
municipal works having been done under color of lawful authority,
when no question as to the validity of the authority was raised,
must be regarded as lawfully done."'4 That the work had been
done in the regular way; that all official acts had been in ac-cordance with what everybody supposed to be the law, that the
defendants had not made the law; and that people had a right
to expect that the officers' acts in these proceedings were in
accordance with constitutional legislation all contributed, in the
mind of the court, to support their decision not to undo the work
of public officials, even though the constitutional warrant for
their acts or offices was defective and would, under the doctrine
of the injunction cases, have justified the court in protecting the
individual against threatened official action had application for
relief only been made earlier in the proceedings. The King Case
emphasizes the doctrine of the Nichols Case, namely, that to obtain relief in this type of case application to the court must be
made at an early stage in the proceedings.
4. Bonds and other Contract Obligattons.-The leading case
on tlus subject is Norton v. Shelby County.'" The facts of this
famous case were as follows
"By the constitution of Tennessee there was, in each county,
but one county court. This was composed of the justices of the
peace elected in their respective districts in the county Under
the act of March 9, 1867, the governor was given power to appoint county commissioners who were to take the place of this
court. The county court was one of the institutions recognized
in the constitution of the state. County commissioners were
authorities unknown to the constitution and previously unknown
to the law of Tennessee. There was no general acquiescence in
the change nor any general recognition of the new commissioners.
On the contrary, the validity of the act was at once assailed.
Within a month after its passage, a bill was brought against the
47(1893)
154 Pa. St. 160, 26 Atl. 308.
48King v. Philadelphia County, (1893) 154 Pa. St. 160, 167 26
At. 308. Cf. Pittsburgh's Petition, (1891) 138 Pa. St. 401, 21 Ati.
757
49(1885) 118 U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178.
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commissioners, and public opposition continued in various forms,
until the case was finally settled. While litigation to test their
authority was pending the commissioners issued county bonds to
the amount of $29,000 and the liability of the county on these
bonds became a subject of further controversy "50
This "further controversy" was the subject matter of the Norton
Case. The supreme court decided that no recovery could be had
on the bonds. That this was a proper disposition of the case
seems clear. The people who purchased bonds under such circumstances as those presented in the Norton Case had notice of
possible defects in the issue and the court could, in accordance
with recognized rules of notice and estoppel, have justified the
result reached. The case was not decided on these grounds,
however, but was placed on grounds relating to the doctrines of
de facto and the effect of an unconstitutional law
Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, explained
at considerable length the reasons for the doctrine of de facto
officers. Following this explanation he said, "But the idea of
an officer implies the existence of an office which he holds."
The justice then reviews the argument presented by counsel on
the question whether an unconstitutional statute can create an
office. In stating the position of counsel for the bondholders
Justice Field said, that their position was "that a legislative act,
though unconstitutional, may in terms, create an office, and
nothing further than its apparent existence is necessary to give
validity to the acts of its assumed incumbent. That position, although not stated in this broad form, amounts to nothing else."
Concerning this argument he continues
"It is difficult to meet it by any formal argument beyond
this statement. An unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers
no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection it creates
no office, it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though
it had never been passed."
The one redeeming future of this statement of Justice Field
is that it does not purport to be an argument, but is expressly
put forth as a dogmatic statement, and such it surely is. There
is only one effective answer to it it is not true. Courts have
held that unconstitutional statutes have imposed duties, have
granted rights, have created offices, and have some operative effect. The statement is, therefore, not an accurate statement of
the rule of law in this regard. It is, and this is perhaps all
5OWallach, De Facto Officers, 22 Pol. Sci. Quart. 451, 469.
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that it purports to be, a statement of one view of the effect of
an unconstitutional statute, a view applied by many courts in
numerous situations, but applied by no court in all cases.5" The
real weakness in the opinion of Justice Field in this portion of
the opinion is that it assumes the very point to be decided
can an unconstitutional statute create an office, or, phrased in
a somewhat different manner, will the acts of a person purporting
to exercise the functions of an office created by an unconstitutional
statute be treated by a court as valid and binding on the governmental unit for which he holds himself out to act? This
dictum then is a statement of a view, not of an argument. Perhaps it is for this reason that it has been followed by so many
courts, and applied in so many situations, whether such adherence and application accomplished the ends of justice or not.
Had it been presented as argument other judges might have
found it easier to detect its fallacy. As it is, this dictum has
exercised a profound influence in cases involving the effect of
an unconstitutional statute, regardless of the situation presented
to the court which called forth its enunciation.
It is interesting to notice that justice Field says, at the close
of his opinion52
"It may be, as alleged, that the stock of the railroad company
for which they subscribed, is still held by the county If so, the
county may, by proper proceedings, be required to surrender it
to the company, or pay its value, for independently of all restrictions upon municipal corporations, there is a rule of justice
that must control them as it controls individuals. If they obtain
the property of others without right, they must return it to the
true owners, or pay for its value."
This was not, as the justice points out, a question involved in the
case. It indicates however, that the bondholders in this case
would not be remediless. They had merely brought their action
on the wrong ground, basing it on the bonds. They should have
demanded the return of the stock, and if the district had refused
to surrender it, should then have brought an action for conversion.
It is clear, then, that the case worked no more serious hardship
on the plaintiffs than any case in which the wrong action is
brought and the remedy for the wrong misconceived.
5
'Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute, 1 Ind. L. J. 1,
60 Am. L. Rev. 232, 100 Cent. L. J. 145; The Status of a Private Corporation Organized under an Unconstitutional Statute, 17 Cal. L. Rev.
(May,
52 1929).
Norton v. Shelby County, (1885) 118 U. S. 425, 454, 6 Sup.
Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178.
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In City of East St. Louis v WVitts"3 an action of debt was
brought against the city on some scrip issued by certain police
commissioners whose offices had been created by an invalid statute. The city was held not liable, apparently on the same theory
as that expressed in the Norton Case.
In connection with these two cases the case of Schloss &
Kahn v McIntyre5 4 is of interest. Defendants in that case were
commissioners in charge of a local liquor dispensary
They
purchased liquor from the plaintiff for purposes of re-sale in the
dispensary The statute establishing the dispensary, and creating
the offices of commissioners, was held to be unconstitutional.
Suit was brought against the commissioners to hold them liable in
their individual capacity They were not in the business for
profit, received no benefit from the conduct of it, and made no
personal promise to pay for the stock purchased, and for these
reasons the court decided that they could not be held individually
liable for the debt.
In People ex rel. Bolton v Albertson" the city sought to
escape payment of a bill for coal sold to the police department, on
the ground that a new board had superseded the one to which
plaintiff had sold the coal. Plaintiff asked for a mandamus to
compel the signature of warrants to pay for the coal and the
court granted the mandamus, declaring the statute creating the
new board to be unconstitutional.
One entering into a contract with a board of trustees for a
city, whose offices are created by an invalid law, is bound by the
contract, and may not obtain rescission of it merely on the
53(1871) 59 Ill. 155. In Parks v. Commissioners of Wyandotte
County, (D.C. Kans. 1894) 61 Fed. 436, and First Nat. Bk. of Lansdale
v. Commissioners of Wyandotte County, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1895) 68
Fed. 878, the bonds issued by officers holding offices created by an
invalid statute were held to be non-negotiable. The court seems
however, to have thought that despite this feature of the case the
bonds would not have been binding obligations, because falling within
the rule of the Norton Case. It is often impossible to collect bonds
In such a case because of the difficulty of procuring validating legislation and also because the courts in the middle western states seemed
disposed in the latter part of the past century to be rather ready to
find grounds for defeating recovery. This was corrected to some
extent by the position taken by the federal courts, but the instant
case illustrates that recovery was sometimes difficult to obtain even in
those courts. The writer is indebted to the officers of the First National Bank of Lansdale, Pa., for information as to the outcome
of the litigation in the instant case. The bondholders in these cases
were unable to recover anything.
54(1906) 147 Ala. 557 41 So. 11.
55(1873) 55 N. Y 50.
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ground of the defect in the title of the trustees with whom he
contracted. 56 Nor can the constitutional qualifications of a commissioner appointed by the governor to apportion the cost of
building a bridge between several railroads be questioned in an
action on the contract by one road to obtain reimbursement of a
share in the expense paid for another road. Such an officer is
entitled to de facto status. 5 7 It should perhaps be observed, relative
to this last case, that it involved no question of the effect of an
unconstitutional statute. It does, nevertheless, indicate the attitude
which courts might be expected to take towards the acts of an
officer whose title to office is challenged because of some constitutonal defect in his alleged status. The case would be quite as
strong for holding an officer de facto in such a situation as that
last mentioned, if the defect had been in the statute providing for
his appointment, instead of in his qualifications for the office.
5. Torts.-Suppose that an action is brought against a village
to recover damages for an injury due to a defective sidewalk.
The defendants are the president and trustees of the village of X.
The complaint alleges among other things that the village is
a corporation, validly incorporated under the laws "made and
provided" for the organization of villages of tlus class. The
defendants file a demurrer to the complaint, claiming that there
is no such corporation as the president and trustees of the village
of X. In this type of case the Wisconsin court held that the
village existed under another valid law, but that the one under
which incorporation had been attempted was invalid. Furthermore, the statute regulating the selection of the officers of the
village was unconstitutional. There was, then, presented to the
court a case in which the office was held to be created by a valid
statute, the incumbents of which had been selected in accordance
with an invalid law. Were they de facto officers?" Could de56
Heck v. Findlay Window Glass Co., (1898) 8 Oh. Cir. Dec. 757
See Erwin v. Jersey City, (1897) 60 N. J. L. 141, 145, 370 At. 732: "It
is beyond doubt that his acts on matters in which the corporation
attorney could act would bind the city and parties dealing with the
city."
57Fitchburg R. R. v. Grand Junction R. R. & Depot Co., (1861)
1 Allen (Mass.) 552. Cf. Shelby v. Alcorn, (1858) 36 Miss. 273. 72
Am. Dec. 169, defective title is good defense to action to recover
money paid, the work not having been performed per contract. The
title defect arose from the holding of constitutionally incompatible
offices.
5
8Cole v. President and Trustees of Black River Falls, (1883) 57
Wis. 110.
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fendant deny their title to office? In answer to these questions the
court said, holding them de facto
"And the fact that they are in by color of a law which is unconstitutional and void, does not make an exception to the rule."
The city was not permitted to deny the validity of the law providing
for the selection of these officers. It is difficult to say whether a
similar result would have been reached had the statute creating the
offices likewise been invalid, in the absence of any other valid
statute under which the city might have been organized.",
6. Civil Cases in which Office or Title of Judicial or Clerical
Officer is Challenged.-(a) The judge trying a civil case may have
been appointed or elected to office under an invalid statute. May
one of the parties to the suit appeal from a judgment rendered
by a judge so chosen, on that ground? The rule seems to be
that he cannot. A judge elected or appointed to office in accordance with an invalid statute is a de facto officer and his title to
office cannot be challenged by one of the parties to a civil suit,
on appeal. One opinion sets forth three arguments in support
of this rule-6 (1) There is a strong public policy in favor of
recognizing the acts of such judges so that judicial business may
be carried on in an orderly manner, and cases settled on their
merits. (2) The judge is not a party to the action and has no
opportunity to defend the attack upon his title. It would be unfair
to try a man's title to office when he was not to be given a hearing
on the question. (3) This is a collateral attack, and only the state
should be permitted in a direct attack to question the title of an
officer, collateral attack being objectionable on the ground that continuous assaults upon official title would be made by private individuals who might have something to gain if they could succeed in
the attack. With respect to these points the following observations might be made That the first is the real basis of the decision, that the second is at least partially unsound because even
if the title of the judge was declared to be defective that would
not of necessity mean that he would be ousted from office, ouster
following only upon judgment in quo warranto proceedings, and
finally, the third is not a reason but rather a statement of a rule
of law That the first reason advanced is the real basis for the
decision appears from the following quotation from this same
opinion

."1

59For discussion of this factor in municipal corporation cases, see
Tooke, De Facto Municipal Corporations Under Unconstitutional
Statutes, 37 Yale L. J. 935.
6
OCurtin v. Barton, (1893) 139 N. Y 505, 34 N. E. 1093.
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"When a court with competent jurisdiction is duly established, a suitor who resorts to it for the administration of justice
and the protection of private rights should not be defeated or
embarrassed by questions relating to the title of the judge, who
presides in the court, to his office. If the court exists under the
constitution and laws and it had jurisdiction of the case, any
defect in the election or mode of appointing the judge is not
available to litigants."
In another case, in which a writ of prohibition was sought to
prevent a lower court from proceeding with the trial of a civil
case the writ was denied, because, said the court, only the state
could assail the title of the judge before whom the case was being
tried. 2 The court said, in the course of its opinion .13
"Counsel argues that relator has no other available remedy
for the wrong that is about to be done to him, and that, inasmuch
as there must be a remedy for every wrong, therefore a writ of
prohibition will lie. But the fallacy consists in the assumption
that relator is threatened with any wrong. Respondent being a
justice de facto, his acts are as valid as if he was a justice de jure.
In fact, as to everybody except the state in proceedings by
quo warranto to test his right to the office, he is, in effect, a
justice de jure."
There is some authority to the contrary, however, and one of the
parties to a civil action in a Baltimore court obtained a writ of
mandamus to compel the removal of a case to another court, the
one in which it was about to be tried being presided over by a
judge chosen by virtue of an invalid statute.6 4 The fact that there
existed a de jure court capable of taking and trying the case
doubtless caused the court in this case to hesitate less than would
ordinarily be the case, to grant the writ. Had there not been this
other court to which the case could immediately have been taken
and tried the result might well have been different.
When the defect is in the constitution of the office, instead of
68 Curtin v. Barton, (1893) 139 N. Y. 505, 34 N. E. 1093. People
ex rel. Kearney v. Carter, (1859) 29 Barb. (N.Y.) 209.
62State ex rel. Derusha v. McMartin, (1889) 42 Minn. 30, 43
N. W 572.
63State ex rel. Derusha v. McMartin, (1889) 42 Minn. 30, 31, 43
N. W
6 572. Cf. Laver v. McGlachlin, (1871) 28 Wis. 364.
4Lewin v. Hewes, (1912) 118 Md. 624, 86 ktl. 833. In Smith
v. Normant, (1833) 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 271, a statute providing for the
appointment of a temporary judge was held invalid, and the commission of the judge said to be "void, and he incapable of doing any
judicial act," so therefore the parties in a civil suit were permitted
to challenge his acts. The court said, further, that "the judgments,
decrees, and orders are all void, and must be set aside, and the causes
remanded to the respective courts from whence they came, to be proceeded in." Ibid 278.
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in the method of choice the courts are in irreconcilable conflict,
some permitting attack while others refuse it.
In Burt v. Winona and St. Peter R. R.05 the Minnesota court
refused to permit one of the parties to a civil action to question the
legality of the office of the judge who was trying the case, holding
that even if the statute establishing the court had failed to receive
the constitutionally required number of votes in the upper house
the judge would be a de facto officer. The view of the court
is well summarized in the statement that "The reason given for
the de facto doctrine applies as well to offices and courts as to
officers." The injustice of permitting cases to be decided upon
such incidental points, instead of on their merits, the inconvenience and uncertainty which would inevitably follow the introduction of the doctrine that there can be no de facto office tinder an
unconstitutional statute, and the hardship on litigants of compelling them to ascertain the legal title of a particular judge to office
before daring to go to trial with a case, were stressed by the
court as factors causing it to refuse to permit the legal existence
of the office to be questioned. The court thought that where an
office exists under "color of right that is, under color of law"
that the incumbent of such an office should be unmolested in his
possession of it until the state took the initiative in ousting him
by means of quo warranto. A federal circuit court for the district
of Minnesota applied the same rule as that laid down by the
Burt Case.66
On the other hand, the Kentucky court in Hildreth's Heirs
v. M'Inttre's Deznsee 7 held on an appeal from a judgment in a
civil case that proceedings which had previously been taken in a
"court of appeals" created as a rival of the so-called "old court"
were null and void, because the statute creating the new court was
unconstitutional. The court pointed out that there could be a
de facto officer, but that unless by revolution there could not,
65
Burt v. Winona & St. Peter R. R., (1884) 31 Minn. 471, 18
N. W 283. Cf. Shafford v. Brown. (1908) 49 Wash. 307 95 Pac. 270.
See dictum in State ex rel. Smallwood v. Windom, (1915) 131 Minn.
401, 155 N. WV629.
66Comstock v. Tracey, (C.C. Minn. 1891) 46 Fed. 162. This

likewise was a civil case, and the statute creating the court was alleged not to have received the requisite number of votes in the upper

house of the state legislature. The court held that the statute could
not be assailed in this case.
67(1829) 1 J. J. Marsh, (Ky.) 206. Frame v. Treble, (1829) 1
J. 3. Marsh, (Ky.) 205, State v. Gillette's Estate, (Tex. Com. of App.

1928) 10 S.W

(2d) 984.
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under a constitutional government, be a de facto office. " The fact
that the legality of the organization of the new court had been
consistently resisted from the time of its establishment doubtless
made the court feel less hesitant to pronounce its judgments
totally void. A judgment of a justice of the peace in New York
was reversed because the statute creating the office was invalid."'
A similar view to that expressed in the Hildreth Case was taken
in Ex parte Roundtree,71 wherein the Alabama court issued a
writ of prohibition forbidding a judge to proceed with the trial
of a case, the court treatng both the office and the method of
choice as bad. The court said, in the course of its opinion, that"1
"The usurpation of judicial power-the holding of pretended
courts-is a great public wrong, productive of uncertainty and
confusion, beclouding the title to property, vexing and harassing
the citizen, involving him in a conflict of duties, subjecting him
to oppression, and detracting from the dignity and authority of
the known and established tribunals. It would be a reproach to
the law and to justice, if there were not a speedy remedy to
prevent such usurpation."
One cannot but wonder whether the results -referred to by the
court in this extract from its opinion were not more sure to follow
from the view expressed therein than from the view that the
title of the judge should not, in such a case, be permitted to be
questioned by litigants. The reasons advanced by the Alabama
court are exactly those which might well be advanced to justify
the doctrine of the Burt Case. As to the argument that there
be a "speedy remedy to prevent such usurpation" the ready reply
is that such a remedy is available, quo warranto at the instance
of the state.
In Masterson v. Mathews 72 the Alabama court treated the

case as one involving only the constitutionality of the method of
choosing the judge, and held that in a suit on a judgment rendered
by a judge selected in accordance with the invalid statute the
defendant would not be permitted to object that the judge's title
to office was defective. The difference between the two cases
lies partly in the different attitude of the court towards the statute,
6sThis question often arises in connection with de facto govern-

ments in international law. These cases will not be dealt with in this
study.
69
Waters v. Langdon, (1863) 40 Barb. (N.Y.) 408. It is not altogether clear whether this was a crimnal or civil case, but it seems
to have been a civil one.
70(1874) 51 Ala. 42.
71Ex parte Roundtree, (1874) 51 Ala. 42, 51.
72(1877) 60 Ala. 260.
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for in the latter case the court was treated as having been validly
created, while in the former the law of its creation was declared
invalid, in addition to the law providing for the selection of the
judge, and partly in the time element, the prohibition in the
Roundtree Case being sought early in the case, while the challenge
of title in the Masterson Case came after judgment had been
rendered. It is only natural that the court should be more hesitant
to disturb what has proceeded that far, particularly when the
ground of objection is so remote from the merits of the case.
That the time element is not accorded the same weight by
all courts is illustrated by the decision of the California court
denying a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of an execution on a judgment given by a judge of a court created by
an invalid statute. 73 The defendant was permitted at that late
stage in the proceedings to challenge the existence of the court.
However, if the defect goes only to the method of filling the
office the courts incline to deny attack on title. Thus, in Taylor
v

Skrine 74 and Neal v

Kent

7

'

the courts of South Carolina

and Kansas respectively denied motions to set aside and vacate
judgments, the motions being supported in each case by the argument that the judge in each instance had been selected by virtue
of an unconstitutional statute.
The courts tend to view defects in statutes increasing the
number of judges in a district, or on a court, as one going to the
method of filling the office, instead of as going to the existence
of the court. In these cases the de facto doctrine is generally
applied, and judgments rendered by judges under these circunstances are not open to attack."6 In Nagel v Bosworth" the
3
7 Miner

v. Justices Court, (1898) 121 Cal. 264, 53 Pac. 795.
74(1815) 3 Brev. (S.C.) 516.
75(1918) 102 Kan. 239, 169 Pac. 1152. In Thompson v. Couch,
(1906) 144 Mich. 671, 108 N. W 363, one of the parties in a petty
civil case asked for a writ of prohibition to prevent further consider
ation of a case by a lower court. He alleged the law creating the
court, as well as that providing for the selection of the judge, was invalid. The court held the officer to be de facto, the office being created
by a 76valid statute.
Rude v. Sisack, (1908) 44 Col. 21, 96 Pac. 976, two judges, should
be one. The judge whose acts were assailed had been ousted by quo
warranto. People ex rel. Attorney General v. Johnson, (1905) 34
Col. 143, 86 Pac. 233. Butler v. Phillips, (1906) 38 Col. 378, 88 Pac.
480: Rives v. Petit, (1842) 4 Ark. 582. The same view prevails when
qualifications are lacking. Mayo v. Stoneum, (1841) 2 Ala. 390: McInstry v. Tanner, (1812) 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 135. As to incompatibility
of offices and the effect of holding them; McGregor v. Balch, (1842)
14 Vt. 428. Cf. Clayton v. Per Dun, (1816) 13 Johns. (N.Y.) 218.
In McGregor v. Balch, (1842) 14 Vt. 428, 435, the court said. "It
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statute seems to have been considered by the court as one going
to the existence of the office. At least when the Kentucky court
came to distinguish it from the situation involved in the Hildreth
Case the distinction between the two cases was said to be one arising out of the difference between a statute clearly invalid and
one not invalid on its face. The statutes in the two cases were
considered as going to the creation of the office, but the court
thought that the statute in the Hildreth Case was void on its face,
while this was said not to be true of the statute in the Bos-worth
Case. The court said, concerning this distinction .78
"The act, on its face, was a palpable violation of the constitution, as the Legislature was without power to create a court of
appeals, but not so is the act here. The Legislature has power
to create a circuit court, and under certain conditions to add an
additional judge. The act that it passed showed that the conditons existed, which warranted it to create an additional judge."
The situation presented to the court in the Bosu'orth Case was not
quite the same as that involved in the Hildreth Case. They did
have in common, however, a statute creating an office, because
increasing the number of judges was considered by the Kentucky
court as creating that many more offices. The circumstances
were more favorable in the Bosorth Case to elicit the application
of the de facto doctrine than were those involved in the Hildreth
Case. There was absent also, that rivalry that characterized the
dispute behveen the two courts of appeals in the latter case. The
trial of cases would be carried on by the de jure judge of the district, and when the legislature met the difficulties of overwork could
be alleviated. It is then perhaps not accurate to say that the two
cases are in conflict with each other, but the attitude of the court
in the Bosworth Case was nevertheless somewhat different from
will follow, from this, that, either on a quo warranto or in any suit
to which Merrill was a party, when he attempted to act, or to justify
his acts, by virtue of and under his conmission as a justice of the
peace, it might be replied that he was incapable of holding that office.
and, as to him, he would be treated as having no authority whatever
to act, or justify his acts, as such justice, while he held the office of
postmaster under the authority of Congress." But. the court said,
where he was not a party, the question could not be raised, thus
extending the de facto doctrine to this situation.
77(1912) 148 Ky. 807 147 S. W 940. This case is apparently not
one involving a civil proceeding in which one of the parties to the
suit was attacking the title of the judge. It is impossible to tell
from the report of the case exactly what the nature of the action was.
but it appears to have been a suit relative to compensation. The
parties and some statements in the opinion lead to this conclusion.
78(1912) 148 Ky. 807, 809, 147 S. W 940.
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that manifested in the Hildreth Case on the question whether an
invalid statute could create an office.
Occasionally the title of a judge is assailed because he is
said not to possess the constitutional qualifications required for
the office. The same is true with respect to the holding of two
incompatible offices. Attack in these cases is usually unsuccessful, the de facto doctrine being extended to support the validity
of the acts of the judges.7 9 But when an office has been abolished
altogether, there remaining no legal warrant for the court, the
de facto doctrine will not be applied.80
Special judges provided for by invalid statutes have been
held not to be entitled to de facto status, and their acts may be
assailed by parties to the litigation. 81
(b) Cases sometimes arise in which the title of one of the
clerical officers of a court is assailed in a civil case in which
the officer is not one of the parties. In State Bank of Pender v.
Frey8 2 an officer exercising authority over an unconstitutionally
annexed portion of territory was held to be de facto, and recording
a deed with him had the usual effect of notice. 83 But when a
mortgage has been acknowledged before a judge of a court
created by an unconstitutional statute it has been held that there
is "no basis on which to rest an application of the rules saving
the acts of de facto officers. 84 For this reason in a bill to quiet
title a mortgage attempting to convey title to land was held ineffective. In Crawley v. Southern Ry.85 an attempt was made to remove
to a federal district court a case which had been begun in a state
court. The statute creating the judicial district and the office of
deputy clerk was declared invalid by a state court. Because of this
79Supra note 76.

8OAyres v. Lattimer, (1894) 57 Me. App. 78, court
Daniel v Hutcheson, (1893) 4 Tex. Civ. App. 239 22 S. W
81Caldwell v. Barrett, (1903) 71 Ark. 310, 74 S. W
court said: "It would be beyond all precedent to term

abolished.
278, same.
748. The
the judge

presiding in a court which is not a court at all a de facto judge."

A

number of Arkansas cases are reviewed in the opinion. Van Slyke v.
Trempeleau. etc., Ins. Co., (1876) 39 Wis. 390. 20 Am. Rep. 50. "Here
',fr.Cole was not in nossession ot the office of judge. and did not

claim it." The court declared that all that the appointee had accepted
was some of its functions. Cf. discussion under division IV Nagel
v. Bosworth. (1912) 148 Ky. 807 147 S. W 940: Smith v Norniant,
(1833) 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 271.
8-(1902) 3 Neb. Unoff. 83. 91 N. W 239.
83Cf. Cocke v Halsey, (1842) 16 Pet. (U.S.) 71, 10 L. Ed. 890,
effect of filing trust deed after court had adjourned: no question of
constitutionality being involved.
84King Lumber Co. v. Crow. (1908) 155 M\la. 504, 46 So. 646.
85(C.C. Ala. 1905) 139 Fed. 851.
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the federal district court refused to take the case, on the ground
that a suit cannot be removed from a non-existent court. There
being no office there could not be a de facto officer, according to
the vievs expressed by the court. The decision worked an injustice to the plaintiff, and this the court recognized, because the
statute of limitations had run on the cause of action, due to this
delay; but although the court felt that justice was being sacrificed
it did not feel that it could overturn the majority view that there
can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office.
In -these cases there is to be found the same division of opinion as in the preceding sections, some of the courts permitting the
judge's title to be challenged by private litigants if the statute
creating the office is invalid, while if the method of choice is
defective the de facto doctrine is applied.
7 Criminal Cases -i which the Existence of the Court or
the Title to Office of a Judge or Clerical Officer of the Court is
Challenged.-The cases in this section will be considered in the
following order- (a) those involving an attack on the office or
title of a judge, (b) those involving an attack on the office or title
of other officers participating in criminal cases.
(a) One of the leading cases on the question whether the
defendant in a criminal case can attack the title of a judge on
the ground that the statute providing for his selection is unconstituti6nal is that of Brown v O'Connell.8" In that case an action of
debt was brought by the treasurer of Hartford on a recognizance
given by the defendant in the police court of the city The
constitutionality of the law providing that police justices should
be appointed by the council was assailed. The court held the
statute to be invalid, but said that the justice was nevertheless
a de facto officer, occupying the office by "color of appointment."$"
"He was not a usurper. He had color of appointment by the
common council of Hartford, and they had color of delegated
authority from the general assembly"
His acts, said the court, were all done under "forms of law"
and for that reason color was derived "from the law " State v.
Carroll88 involved a situation in which a person accused of petty
crime challenged the constitutionality of a statute permitting a
temporary vacancy to be filled by appointment. The court decided
however, that even though the statute be defective the acts of the
86(1870) 36 Conn. 432.
8
7Brown v. O'Connell, (1870) 36 Conn. 432, 450.
88(1871) 38 Conn. 449.
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temporary appointee would be binding on the plaintiff, the accused
below For that reason the validity of the law was not settled.
For this same reason the statement of the court to the effect that
a person chosen to a de jure office by virtue of an invalid statute
was a de facto officer, was dictum.8"
The rule enunciated in the O'Connell Case is well established
and has been applied in several states."" In one of these cases it
was stated, that91
"The true doctrine seems to be, that it is sufficient if the
officer holds the office under some power having color of authority
to appoint, and that a statute, though it should be found repugnant to the constitution, will give such color."
Another court has expressed the opinion that judges should have
notice that their title is being assailed, and a right to be heard
on the question, before they lose their offices.9" This argument
is open to the same objection that is available to it in the civil
case. 9 3 That is, that officers do not lose their offices even though
the statute should be declared unconstitutional, in the absence of
quo warranto proceedings by the state. The court perhaps expressed a more sound reason for its decision when it said
that it would recognize the acts of the judges in this case because
"under due forms of law they hold their offices by title regular
on its face."" 4 The rule has been applied in a situation in which
a statute legislating out of office one circuit judge, but providing
89"A definition sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to cover
the whole ground must, I think, be substantially as follows: An officer
de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the
law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as
they involve the interests of the public and third persons, where the
Fourth, under color of an
duties of the office were exercised
election or appointment by or pursuant to a public unconstitiitioiial
law, before the same is adjudged to be such." State v. Carroll, (1871)
38 Conn. 449. 471.
9OCampbell v Commonwealth, (1880) 96 Pa. St. 344 Walker v.
See People v. Sassovich, (1886)
State, (1904) 142 Ala. 7 39 So. 242
29 Cal. 480" State ex rel. Bales v. Bailey (1908) 106 Mini. 138, 118
N. W 678, Ex parte Bassitt. (1894) 90 Va. 679, 19 S. E. 453 Town
of Lewiston v Proctor, (1860) 23 III. 533, State v. Bartlett. (1874)
35 Wis. 287
9iEx parte Strang, (1871) 21 Oh. St. 610. The statute here was
not declared unconstitutional, but the court decided that the result
would not be affected even though it had been invalid. In Parks, Petitioner (1880) 3 Mont. 426, the de facto doctrine was applied to deny
attack on a judge by the accused in a trial for assault and battery.
The statute providing for the selection of the justice of peace was
contrary to the organic act of the territory
92Campbell v. Commonwealth, (1880) 96 Pa. St. 344.
9
3Supra section 6a.
94Campbell v. Commonwealth, (1880) 96 Pa. St. 344, 347
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for the selection of another, to uphold the acts of the latter
although the statute was invalid.99 The doctrine applies whether
the judicial officer whose title is assailed be a justice of the
99
peace or a justice of the state supreme court.
On the other hand it seems equally well settled that the
accused may challenge the existence of the court, or of the office
of the judge, and if the statute creating them is unconstitutional
the de facto doctrine will not be applied. The pettiness or inagnitude of the crime of which the defendant is accused seems to
be immaterial. If any difference in attitude is discernible in the
opinons it will perhaps be found to favor leniency in permitting
challenge in cases involving the more serious offences.
The question of the validity of the law creating the court
may be raised, it seems, in any stage of the proceeding, for it
may be effective to quash an indictment, 7 on the one hand, and
to obtain freedom from imprisonment after conviction, in habeas
corpus proceedings,9" on the other.
In People v. ToaP9 the California court, while admitting the
soundness of the general doctrine that collateral attack should not
be allowed on a de facto officer, held that this rule did not apply
when the existence of the office itself was in question. Counsel
argued, in this case, that the de facto doctrine should be applied
to give validity to the acts of judges in criminal cases because of
the difficulties which would result in the effective administration
95State
v. Douglass, (1872) 50 Mo. 593.
96
State v. Cochran, (1909) 55 Or. 157 105 Pac. 884, the constitutionality of a statute providing for the addition of two justices
to the supreme court of the state. The court decided, the two justices
whose title was involved not sitting, that their acts would be binding
on litigants, because they would at any rate be justices de facto. The
statute was, however, held to be constitutional. See Covle v. Sherwood, (1873) 1 Hun. (N.Y.) 272, justices of peace.
v. O'Brian, (1878) 68 Me. 153.
97State
9
sEx parte Babe Snyder, (1876) 64 Mo. 58.
99(1890) 85 Cal. 333, 24 Pac. 603. Cf. People v. White, (1840) 24
Wend. (N.Y.) 520; People ex rel. Sinkler v. Terry, (1888) 108 N. Y
1, 14 N. E. 815; State v. Fritz, (1875) 27 La. Ann. 689. See Ex parte
Reilly, (1890) 85 Cal. 632, 24 Pac. 807 A number of cases hold
that the de facto doctrine does not apply when a person performs
some of the functions of an office not yet in existence. State v.
Shuford, (1901) 128 N. C. 588, 38 S. E. 808; In re Manning, (1890)
139 U. S. 504, 11 Sup. Ct. 624, 35 L. Ed. 264. The same result follows
if a court has been abolished. Gorman v. People, (1892) 17 Col. 596,
31 Pac. 335. Also if no statute establishes the court. In re Norton,
(1902) 64 Kan. 842, 68 Pac. 639. Cf. State ex rel. Henderson v.
County Court, (1872) 50 Mo. 317 11 Am. Rep. 415; Caldwell v.
Barrett, (1903) 71 Ark. 310, 74 S. W 748; In Matter of Quinn, (1897)
152 N. Y. 89, 86 N. E. 175.
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of the criminal law if attack on the existence of the court was
permitted. To this contention the court answered that they realized
that a few criminals might escape, but that the number would
not be large. Furthermore, they were convinced that the statute
in question was so clearly unconstitutional that arguments based
on policy to the contrary notwithstanding, they must hold it invalid. There was, thought the court, a stronger countervailing
policy in favor of enforcing explicit constitutional limitations on
legislative procedure, the act in this case having been in the form
of a resolution, instead of in the form of a statute, as required
by the constitution.
In the course of its opinion the court said, in the Toal Case,
that most of the criminals in the city, of the government of which
this particular court was a part, would be brought to trial subsequently, in the other courts which existed in the city It, therefore,
hesitated less than would otherwise be the case, in discharging the
prisoner Suppose however, that a person had been convicted of a
serious crime, such as assault to commit murder which was the
crime involved in the Toal Case. Could he, subsequent to his
discharge following an appeal on which the statute creating the
court was declared unconstitutional, be again brought to trial, this
time in a different court? Could he not successfully plead that this
constituted double jeopardy?1 °° If his trial in the "non-existent"
court should be held to be one jeopardy the situation would then
be that of a person accused and convicted of a serious crime
going unpunished. Even if such a trial should be held not to
constitute one jeopardy there is another factor to be considered
the effect of such decisions releasing persons guilty of crime on
the efficiency and zeal of law enforcement officers. While not
conclusive, this should at all times cause a court to hesitate in
discharging a person accused and convicted of serious crime on
grounds so far removed from the merits of the case.
Why should the accused in such a case be permitted to assail
the existence of the office of a judge? Does the fact that he
is appointed by the city council instead of by the governor, or
lOONo

case has been found in which this precise question was

raised. Courts disregarding entirely a statute which has been declared
invalid, in the strict ab initio sense, might hold that trial before such

a court did not constitute a trial for legal purposes.
might in a more realistic vein call it one jeopardy.

Other courts

Cf. McGinnis v.

State, (1848) 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 43, holding that if accused person ac

quiesces in trial under invalid statute defining a crime, he could not

subsequently be tried under a valid statute.
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that he was elected in accordance with a statute which did not
meet the title requirements of the state constitution, or which was
not read three times in the upper house, make the judge any more
incompetent or prejudiced in the trial of a case? Is the grand
jury indictment, or the information of the prosecuting attorney
in such cases likely to be more defective or biased in one or the
other of these cases? The accused in such a case is given a fair
hearing and is tried before an impartial jury If he is found
guilty in a trial conducted in the regular manner it seems that he
should be treated as are all other persons convicted of the same
crime. The state has, of course, an interest in enforcing the
constitutional limitations which are placed upon legislative power
so that the machinery of government may be established in an
orderly manner, and on a sound constitutional basis. It should
be permitted, and is permitted, to challenge the existence of a
court. It should be observed, however, that when a judge is
ousted by quo warranto proceedings, this in no wise affects
the status of the persons accused of crime whose cases may be
on the docket of the court for trial. It is therefore submitted
that persons accused of crime should not be permitted to question
1
the existence of the court before which they are being tried. "'
The fact that there is an irregularity in the constitution of a
judicial district in which a court is held is not sufficient to invali0This applies
date the acts of a judge sitting in such a district.'
03
to a case in which the boundaries of the district or the population
of a district are not such as to meet the requirements of the constitution. 0 4 In one of the cases dealing with a constitutional populaton requirement, the court said, in holding the judge to be a
de facto officer,"0 5
"A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the power
of sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to the
attack of the sovereign power alone."
Any other rule, thought the court, would ruin the administration
of the criminal law Some courts take the view, in these population cases, that the legislature is the final judge of whether a
judicial district or a county has sufficient population to satisfy the
' 0 'See infra part IV
1o-CIark v. Commonwealth, (1858) 29 Pa. St. 129.
1O3Kline v. State, (1906) 146 Ala. 1, 41 So. 953; Speck v. State,
(1872) 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 46.
lo4Coyle v. Commonwealth, (1893) 104 Pa. St. 117 In re Ah Lee,
(D.C. Or. 1880) 5 Fed. 899. Contra, holding de facto, Barber v. State,
(1905)05 143 Ala. 1, 39 So. 318.
Covle v. Commonwealth, (1883) 104 Pa. St. 117
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constitutional requirement relative thereto, putting these cases
in the category of those said to involve "political questions.' 0
The constitutional qualifications of judges,10' as well as the
holding of incompatible offices by them, 108 are not open to question
by persons brought before them for trial. The de facto doctrine
extends to judges in these situations.
(b)
Persons accused of crime sometimes seek to impeach
the title of prosecutors, policemen, or other officers engaged in
the work of law enforcement. State v Poulinos is doubtless tile
leading case on the question whether the title of a criminal prosecutor can be impeached by a person brought to trial on an indictment procured and signed by a prosecuting attorney whose office
has been created by an unconstitutional law The Maine court
held, in an elaborate opinion, that this could not be done, and
that the prosecutor was a de facto officer despite the fact that the
statute involved went to the existence of the office itself. The
court expressed the opinion that the same reasons which
would cause it to hold that an officer was dc facto when a statute
providing for his selection was unconstitutional should cause it
to hold likewise when the statute creating the office was invalid.
The fact that many fines had been imposed in prosecutions instituted by this prosecutor, that people had not only submitted
to his authority, but had expected him to enforce the law by
performing the functions of his office caused the court to treat
his acts as valid, and to hold that their legality could not be
questioned in this collateral way
In accordance with the view expressed in the Poulin Case
the Georgia court has held that a person indicted for murder
whose prosecution was carried on by an attorney performing the
functions of his office in a district a part of which had been included by virtue of an invalid statute, could not assail the title
to office of the prosecutor for that reason. The de facto doctrine
was applied so as to protect the acts of the state's attorney from
attack, so far as they had taken place with respect to cases in the
lO6Ex parte Renfrow, 112 Mo. 591, 20 S. W 682: State v. Leonard. (1856) 22 Mo. 449- State v. York, (1856) 22 Mo. 462: State v.
Wiley (1891) 109 Mo. 439. For additional cases see Field, The
Status of a Municipal

Corporation Organized Under an Unconstitu-

tional Statute, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 523.
lo7State v. Blancett, (1918) 24 N. Mex. 433, 174 Pac. 207 Thomas
Sheehan s Case, (1877) 122 Mass. 445 State ex rel. Kiernan v Recorder, (1896) 48 La. Ann. 1375, 20 So. 908.
losCommonwealth v. Kirby (1849) 2 Cush. 377
109(1909) 105 Me. 224, 74 Atl. 119. Note, 8 Mich. L. Rev 229
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wrongfully annexed territory 110 A mandamus will lie at the
instance of the attorney general to compel a judge to restore a
criminal case to the docket for trial, it having been removed
because the indictment had been returned by a grand jury held
under a judge in a district created by an invalid law I People
2
ex -el. Bromrn v. Blakel is difficult to justify In that case a
policeman arrested the relator. The officer had been appointed to
office by the town board of trustees. The members of this board
had been appointed to office. The statute authorizing their appointment was invalid, election being the constitutionally provided mode
of filling the office. This board of trustees had caused the
relator's arrest by making a complaint before a justice of the
peace. The accused petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and
was awarded the writ, receiving his discharge. The decision is
contrary to the weight of authority from whatever angle it
be viewed. In the first place it is out of line in holding that the
acts of an officer engaged in enforcing the law may be challenged
by the accused when the constitutionality of the statute providing
for the filling of a de jure office was involved. In the second
place the decision is contrary to the majority rule which denies
attack on a statute under which a municipality is organized. The
statute in this case also provided for the incorporation of the
village. The court gave little attention to this phase of the case.
In the third place, if the trustees be eliminated from the case the
objection may be advanced that the relator was permitted to
challenge the title to office of the appointors of the officer who had
arrested him. Attack on the title of an official directly concerned with the proceedings is sufficiently objectionable, but it is
much more objectionable to permit this "running back" along
the line of appointing authority in a search for some constitutional break in the chain.
8. Cases of Crwies -nvolving Officzal Stat(us.-Suppose that
X is indicted for extortion. He defends by asserting that he is
not an officer because the statute creating the office he purported
to hold is unconstitutional. In New Jersey X was permitted to
set up this defence, and obtain his freedom thereby After stating
31OGodbee v. State, (1914) 141 Ga. 515, 81 S. E. 876.
I"Ex parte State, (1904) 142 Ala. 87, 38 So. 835.
United States, (1839) 1 Phinney (Wis.) 77 prosecutor
jure office, but held two incompatible offices, contrary to
act of the territory. Held, a de facto officer.
112(1867) 49 Barb. (N.Y.) 9. See criticism of this
re Ah Lee, (D.C. Or. 1880) 5 Fed. 899.

In Lask v.
held a de
the organic
case in. In
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that "an official character, either de facto or de jure, is essential"
to constitute the crime of extortion, the court stated :113
"These defendants were never the officers they are charged to
have been, and therefore could not as such have extorted. This
inexorable legal conclusion is the result of the unconstitutionality
of the statute which created the office of license commissioners in
certain counties, which offices the defendants are charged with
using for extortionate purposes."
One wonders how inexorable this conclusion is when reading the
case of State v. Gardner"' in which the Ohio court held in a case
involving an indictment for offering a bribe to a city commissioner
that the latter was a de facto officer, although the statute which
was assailed in this case not only created the office of commissioner
but was the source of corporate existence of the city itself. The
Gardner Case presented a somewhat stronger situation for the
application of the de facto doctrine than did the New Jersey
case, because of the policy favoring the denial of collateral attack
on municipal corporations. In the Gardner Case both the office
and the municipality were involved, while in the New Jersey case
only the office was in question. The attitudes of the two courts
were, however, quite at variance.
Whether the New Jersey court still adheres to the rule of
this case is not clear. The opinion seems to rely to a considerable
extent on the case of Flaicwher v Caniden," 5 an earlier New Jersey
case. There defendant set up a license granted to him by a board
as a defence to a prosecution for selling liquor without a license.
The state assailed the validity of the statute creating the board
from the members of which defendant had received his license.
The statute was declared invalid. The court held, that because of
this the license afforded no defence, and the conviction was affirmed. This decision is criticized in Lang v Mayor of Bayonne," 6 and expressly overruled in the course of the opinion in
the latter case. Does an express statement that the case is overruled have its full apparent effect, however when the situations
in the two cases are so different from each other as they were
The Lang Case involved a dispute between
in these two cases
11Kirby et al. v. New Jersey (1894) 57 N. J. L. 320, 322, 31
Atl. 213, 214.
114(1896) 54 Oh. St. 24, 42 N. E. 999.
"SFlaucher v. Camden, (1893) 56 N. J. L. 244, 28 Atd. 82.
116(1906) 74 N. J. L. 455, 63 Ati. 270, 68 Atd. 90. The court said
in the Flaucher Case that "The only case which I have found which
gives countenance to the view that there can exist a de facto
officer without a de jure office, is that of Burt v. Winona & St. Peter
R. R." (1884) 31 Minn. 472, 18 N. W 283.
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an inferior and a superior officer. The Flaucier Case involved
a prosecution for selling liquor without a license. Perhaps it is
more accurate to say that the attitude of the court in the Flaucher
Case towards the problem of the application of the de facto doctrine to cases involving offices created by unconstitutional statutes
was disapproved in the Laizg Case, rather than to say that one case
overruled the other.
There is some authority for the New Jersey view, in the
early case of People v. Albertson,"7 in New York. That case goes
so far as to hold that a person is not guilty of perjury if he testifies falsely in a trial before a justice of the peace holding a de
jure office, but chosen to fill it in accordance with an invalid law.
In view of the overwhelming weight of authority to the effect
that in other types of situations the de facto doctrine will be extended to give binding effect to the acts of officers whose title
to offices de jure is defective, a different result from that in the
Albertson Case might well be reached if the situation presented in
that case should come before a court at the present time.
III
COMPENSATION

The decisions on the effect of an unconstitutional statute on
the right to compensation of an officer selected in accordance
therewith are not harmonious.
In Meagher v. County of Storey" 8 plaintiff sued the county
to recover compensation for services rendered as magistrate. He
had held the office of recorder in a city and a statute had conferred on the holder of that office the power of also acting as a
magistrate. The supreme court of Nevada held that no recovery could be had. The court said that he had no authority to
serve as a magistrate. For that reason his services were gratuitous, "for the right to the salary depends upon the title to such
office, and cannot be recovered by one who is simply an officer
.17(1853) 8 How. (N.Y.) 363. In Herrigton v. State, (1898)
103 Ga. 319, 29 S. E. 931, the defence to an indictment of extortion
was the non existence of the office. The county board had attempted
to create the office, but had no statutory authority to do so. Held,
indictment quashed. In Morford v. Territory of Oklahoma, (1901)
10 Okla. 745, 63 Pac. 960, the defendant was accused of perjury. It
appeared that the judge before whom the trial in which the perjury
was alleged to have been committed lacked the statutory qualifications
for office. Held, the judge was de facto, and the accused could not
assail title to office.
118(1869) 5 Nev. 244.
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de facto." The acts of the plaintiff were, nevertheless said to be
valid as to third parties, although""
"The considerations which support and validate the acts of
an officer de facto do not go so far as to require the payment of
fees to such officer for services so performed."
The case of Reddy v. Tink u"

2°

involved a mandamus to

compel the payment of a warrant against a county, the warrant
being drawn in favor of the plaintiff. The county as constituted
by statute included some territory belonging to the state of Nevada, and located in that state. The county was, for this reason,
defectively organized, said the court, in denying the petition for
the writ. The warrant was not a claim against this county, and
plaintiff was not a de facto officer of any governmental organization.
On the other hand, the New Jersey court held in Erunn v
Jersey City"' that a city attorney could recover compensation for
services rendered by him in his official capacity, even if the statute authorizing the board of commissioners to appoint him to
office was invalid. The New Jersey court took the view that
the plaintiff had rendered services, therefore he should receive his
compensation. This is quite a different view from that adopted
by the Nevada court, which maintained that salary was due to an
officer only because of his title to office.
A group of New York cases have also passed on this question. The earliest of them is Morris v People. 2 2 The suit in
that case was brought by the prosecutor for the state on the relation of a judge to recover a statutory penalty for refusal to audit
a claim against the county for salary The statute creating the
court was assailed as unconstitutional, and it was contended that
the judge therefore was not entitled to compensation. That being
so, counsel argued, it followed that the defendants had properly
refused to audit the claim. The legislature had by statute made
the salary of these judges charges against the county The court
held, Senator Lott speaking for the majority, that the penalty
was recoverable, that even if the statute was unconstitutional
the judge was an officer de facto whose title could not be collaterally impeached in a proceeding to which he was not a party
The services were rendered by the judge and the legislature had
""DMeagher v. County of Storey, (1869) 5 Nev. 244. 251.
rel. Egbert v. Blumberg. (1907) 46 Wash. 270, 89 Pac. 708.
120(1882) 60 Cal. 458.
"2(1897) 60 N. J.L. 141, 37 Ati. 732.
122(1846) 3 Demo (N.Y.) 381.

State ex
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the power to make this a county charge, and that being the case,
the defendants had no alternative but to audit the claim or pay
the penalty.
People ez rel. Kingstand v. Bradley'2 is the second of the
New York cases. There a mandamus was granted to compel
the treasurer of a county to pay a salary claim although the statute authorizing the appointment of the person to whom the salary
was due was invalid. This case is perhaps not as strong an authority as the Morris Case, in support of the doctrine that such
claims can be enforced, because the court treated the case as one
involving legislative ratification through subsequent appropnatons to pay the claims. This was also an element in the Morris
Case, but not as dearly so as in the Bradley Case. The case
is perhaps an authority to the effect that the legislature may appropriate money to pay claims of officers whose title to office
was defective. The Bradley Case differs from the Morris Case
also in this, that the statute in the latter case which was defective was one creating the office, while in the former case the
statute involved was one providing for the filling of the office.
Demarest v. The Mayor 24 is the third of the New York
cases, and holds that a city may defeat an action for salary by a
de jure officer by showing that the money had been paid to a
person holding a certificate of election, though the election had
been held under an invalid statute. The case was distinguished
by the court from that of Norton v. Shelby Couity'" on the
ground that there existed in the Demarest Case a de jure office,
while in the Norton Case this was not true.
Where the statute creating the office was invalid the Illinois court refused to permit the claimant to the office to recover
money deposited with the city, alleged to belong to him, the basis
of the claim being that the city had no right to retain the money,
12
This
it having been obtained by means of a non-existent office.
not
enwas
city
the
that
conceding
because
is a proper holding,
123(1872) 6 Barb. (N.Y.) 228.
124(1895), 147 N. Y. 203, 41 N. E. 405. The court in this case
treated the office as validly existing saying at p. 209, in answer to a

contrary contention: "Unless the office did not exist by law, how
could the plaintiff and his associates base their present claim to have
been elected to it? This very demand and suit are an ample concession
that aldermanic offices existed to be filled."

125(1885) 118 U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178.

1-6City of Chicago v. Burke, (1907)

226 Ill. 191, 80 N. E. 720.

Where no law authorized office, see Ward v. Cook, (1898) 78 Ill.
App. 11.
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titled to it, by the reasoning supporting that conclusion the claimant would also be denied.
A series of Minnesota cases illustrate into what tangled situations courts are sometimes led as a result of conflicting claims
to the salary of an office.
From 1912 to 1915 one Windom was the municipal judge
in the city of Duluth, Minnesota. On April 6, 1915, an election
was held at which one Smallwood was elected to the office of
municipal judge. Windom retained the office, however until
May 3, because of a contest of Smallwood's election. Smallwood took possession of the office on May 3 and performed the
duties of municipal judge until July 30. On this latter date the
supreme court decided that Smallwood was not entitled to the
office because of the unconstitutionality of the preferential voting statute in accordance with which he had been elected. 1 2
Thereupon Windom brought an action to obtain a writ of
mandamus to compel the canvassing board to issue a certificate
of election to him. In this action he was successful.1 2 8 He
assumed the duties of the office on July 31, and performed the
judicial functions attached thereto until September 13. On September 13 the governor of Minnesota appointed Smallwood to
the office of municipal judge of Duluth. This appointment was
made on the theory that the office was vacant, because of the alleged unconstitutionality of a statute entitling Windom to act as
a hold-over judge. On December 17 the supreme court of the
state decided that Smallwood was entitled to the office by virtue
of the executive appointment, the hold-over statute being unconstitutional, and a judgment of ouster was rendered against Windom in an action of quo warranto in which Smallwood was the
relator. 29
The city had paid Smallwood the salary attaching to the
office during a part of the time that Windom had performed the
duties of the office. To recover this money either from the city
of Duluth or Smallwood, Windom brought an action against the
city, joining Smallwood, for such sums as had been paid to
Smallwood. Windom claimed that he was the de jure judge (luring the period up to September 13, when the executive appointment of Smallwood was made.
1278 Brown v. Smallwood, (1915) 130 Minn. 492, 153 N. W 953.
12 State ex rel. Windom v. Prince, (1915) 131 Minn. 399, 155
N. W29 628.
1 State ex rel. Smallwood v. Windom, (1915) 131 Minn. 401,

155 N. W 629.
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The Minnesota supreme court decided that Windom was entitled to compensation for the period he served as judge despite
the fact that he was a hold-over judge under an unconstitutional
statute.130 Smallwood, on the other hand, was said to be entitled
to compensation for the period during which he had performed
the duties of the office. He too, then, received his compensation
despite the fact that he performed Is functions while in office
by virtue of an invalid statute.
The court declined to decide whether de facto status should
be accorded both of the incumbents, each for the period during
which he served. The city was willing to pay whoever was entitled to the money, and the court said that all that needed to be
decided was how much of the money should be paid to each of the
contestants. The opinion in the case intimates that Smallwood
would be required to pay over to Windom the moneys received
during the period while Windom was performing the functions
of the office.
However, the court did stress, in the quo warranto case,'
the de facto status of both of the judges during the period that
each had possession of the office. At all times, said the court,
there existed a de jure office, because in none of the litigation was
the exzstence of the office of municipal judge challenged. The
case involved not the existence of the office, but the validity of
the methods whereby it had been filled. It is submitted that the
Minnesota court decided the last of these cases correctly, and
that is the only one of interest at this point, in giving to each of
the incumbents his salary for the period served.
It appears then that the courts are not only divided on the
question whether salary shall be recovered where the statute creating the office is invalid, but also where the statute filling the office
is invalid, the office being de jure. The courts will probably be
more hesitant to allow recovery where the existence of the office
is questioned, than in cases involving only the validity of the title
13oWindom v. Duluth, (1917) 137 Minn. 154, 162 N. W 1075.
"'State ex rel. Smallwood v. Windom, (1915) 131 Minn. 401,
155 N. W 629. "To avoid useless controversy or litigation it is
proper to say that the official acts of the relator and the respondent
in their various incumbencies of the offices are valid. All the time
there has been a de jure office of municipal judge. All the time there
has been a de facto judge filling the office. The acts of a de facto
judge, actually occupying the office and transacting business, are

valid.

In the actual incumbencies since the April, 1914, election, the

official acts of the incumbent, whether Judge Windom or Judge Small-

wood occupying the office and exercising its functions, are valid."
Minn. at 420-21. See text to note 65, supra.
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to an admittedly valid office. But there may be some tendency,
on the part of those courts who regard service rendered as the
basis of the recovery, to permit recovery even if the defective
statute went to the creation of the office itself. Certainly the legislature can by subsequent legislation provide for the payment
of salary claims, and such legislation will not be objectionable as
appropriating public moneys to private uses. Courts adhering
strictly to the void ab initio theory may be expected for some time
still to refuse to permit recovery in the absence of such legislation. The inequity of this should cause them gradually to adopt
a less severe rule. 132 A few states have adopted statutes regulating the conditions under which payment of salary may be made
to one of the contestants for an office. 133 The matter of compen32

1n
People v. Toal, (1890) 85 Cal. 333, 24 Pac. 603, the court
said at p. 338 in holding the court to have been created by an invalid statute: "And the emoluments of the office to which they were
not entitled will probably compensate the judges for all liabilities
incurred by them by reason of having acted without authority of law."
Query- Could the state recover the money paid to the officer as
salary? In Nagel v. Bosworth, (1912) 148 Ky. 807, 147 S. W 940, the
court said that "a de facto officer is not entitled to the emoluments
of the office, and so Judge Hodge is not entitled to any salary as cirCf. Hubbard v Martin, (1835) 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 498.
cuit judge."
133 Cal. Pol. Code (Deering 1923) sec. 936. "When the title of
the incumbent of any office in this state is contested by proceedings
instituted in any court for that purpose, no warrant can thereafter be
drawn or paid for any part of his salary until such proceedings have
been finally determined, provided, however, that this section shall
not be construed to apply to any party to a contest or proceeding
now pending or hereafter instituted, who holds the certificate of elec
tion or commission of office and discharges the duties of the office:
but such party shall receive the salary of such office, the same as if
no such contest or proceeding was pending."
"As soon as such proceedings are instituted, the clerk
Sec. 937
of the court in which they are pending must certify the facts to the
officers whose duty it would otherwise be to draw such warrants or
pay such salary, except in the cases included in the proviso to the
foregoing section."
Mo. Rev Stat. 1919, sec. 13, 329. "Whenever any office, elective
or appointive, the emoluments of which are required to be paid out
of the state treasury, shall be contested or disputed by two or more
persons claiming the right thereto, or by information in the nature
of a quo warranto then no warrant shall be drawn by the auditor.
or paid by the treasurer, for the salary by law attached to said office,
until the right to the same shall be legally determined between tile
persons or parties claiming such right: Provided, However, and it is
hereby further enacted, that in all cases when the persons to whoni
the commission for such office shall have issued shall deliver to the
party contesting his right to such office a good and sufficient bond.
in double the amount of the annual salary of such office, conditioned
that if, upon final determination of the rights of the contestants, it
shall be decided that the obligor is not, and that the obligee therein
is, entitled to the office, in controversy he shall pay over to the

1
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sation should be regulated by statutes in all of the states, in order
that the government may know to whom to make payments, and
m order that equity may be done between the claimants.
IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A brief statement of the generalizations wtuch might be made
from the cases thus far considered may aid an attempt to examine the points of contact in doctrines as to the effect of an unconstitutional statute with the theories underlying de facto status
in the law of officers.
(1) Persons acting in an official capacity for the state may
assail the legal basis for an office. In granting judgment of ouster
in such cases the courts may use their discretion in delaying the
execution of the judgment in order that the functions of government may not be seriously interrupted.
(2) Official status may be questioned in disputes between
claimants for an office as well as in disputes between two independent officers who may be contesting the power of each other
to perform specific functions. An inferior officer is not ordinarily permitted to assail the official status of one of his superiors.
(3) Private individuals may not, in the absence of statute,
invoke quo warranto to question official status. In other cases
they are similarly restricted, if the defect in official status is one
going to the mode of filling an office instead of a defect in the
constitution of the office itself. However, although there is some
respectable authority to the contrary, the decided weight of authority is that a private individual may question the existence of
an office, in disputes with officers purporting to hold such offices,
if the statute establishing the office is unconstitutional. This is
true in tax, eminent domain, bond, tort, and criminal and civil
cases generally. It applies to judicial as well as clerical officers.
There is perhaps a tendency in the more recent cases to apply
obligee the amount of salary therefor drawn from the date of the
receipt of each installment received by him, then, and in such case,
notwithstanding the provisions of this law, a warrant may be drawn
by the auditor, and paid by the treasurer to the person holding the
commission aforesaid, for the amount of his salary, as the same shall
become due. It shall be the duty of any person contesting the election of any such office to give notice of such contest to the state auditor, and no such contest shall be heard or determined until he shall
satisfy the tribunal trying such contest that such notice has been
given."
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the de facto doctrine in order to prevent private individuals from
questioning official status even though the existence of the office
is involved, but the weight of authority is as yet decidedly to the
contrary
In presenting this analysis of the present state of the rules
of law as to the effect of an unconstitutional statute on the status
of a public officer, it was thought best to omit detailed considerations of theory, except in so far as they were necessarily involved in the approval or criticism of particular cases or classes
of cases. Some care was taken also to avoid dwelling on landmark dicta, some of which have been of controlling importance
in this branch of the law
Is there a sound basis for the distinction which the courts
draw between cases involving the existence of an office and those
involving the method of filling it? A consideration of the reasons which have been advanced in support of the rule denying
collateral attack may be helpful in answering this question. Four
reasons have been suggested in the cases for refusing to permit
a private individual to question official status when the office
is de jure and only the method of filling it is defective.
1. The title of a person to office should not be tried in an
action to which he is not a party There is some merit in this
reason, although it is perhaps not as weighty as would seem to be
the case at first glance. The officer is not personally given an opportunity to enter a defence in many cases, but it often happens that the state or some other governmental division is an interested party The state's attorney in such a case would in effect
then be pleading the case of the officer. So too, for example,
in the case of a civil proceeding, in which the title of a judge is
challenged. The party who is to lose by the successful attack on
the status of the judge may be expected to defend the status of
the officer with varying degrees of diligence. It is true, however,
that in some cases there may not be adequate presentation of the
case of the officer whose status is assailed. On the other hand,
it must be remembered that ouster does not follow an inquiry into
status in any but quo warranto proceedings, so that unless the
state proceeds to oust him the officer may continue the performance of his functions. Against this, in turn, must be balanced
the possibility that private individuals would continue to challenge the authority of the officer to such an extent that for all
practical purposes his work will be seriously hampered or even
completely stopped by repeated inquiries into his official status.
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2. Some courts say that the status of an officer cannot be
questioned in certain types of situations because he is a de facto
officer. At other times the reason is phrased in the rule that
collateral attack will not be permitted on a de facto officer. This
assumes the point to be decided, and is a statement of a rule, but
not of a reason.
3. The reason most usually urged in support of treating an
officer as de jure to all others than the state, is that confusion
in the work of government will ensue from a policy of permitting attack on official status. There is much soundness in this
position, despite the facts that it may be mitigated to some extent by curative and validating legislation, and, as previously
pointed out, actual ouster takes place only when attack is by the
state. Cases should be settled on their merits, so far as possible,
and the work of government should be disrupted as little as possible by private litigants.
-4. In cases involving the status of judges the peculiar situation is presented of having persons pass upon their own status.
It is true that a higher court may with propriety pass upon
the status of a lower one. But what of the case, as in Oregon,
where the status of some of the members of the supreme court
of the state was involved? The court in that case took jurisdiction and passed upon the question, the two justices whose status
was questioned not participating in the decision, and held that
their status was unassailable.
The question -which naturally suggests itself at this point is
whether these reasons are not equally applicable to a case involving the existence of an office? It would seem that the same reasons of public policy apply to the one as to the other. There is,
perhaps, tlus observation to be made concerning the two problems it may be a more serious matter to have an office created
by an unconstitutional statute than to have a particular officer
selected in accordance with an invalid law, because a statute creating an office defines and authorizes the performance of certain
governmental functions. In the case of the defective statute authorizing the selection of the officer the problem is one as to the
method of choice, the functions are in any event to be performed
by somebody It is quite possible that this has been at the basis
of the distinction drawn by the courts between these two classes
of cases. It is not without considerable weight.
But, when the problem is viewed from the standpoint of the
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private individual dealing with the officer, or from that of the
officer whose compensation may be denied because of the nonexistence of the office, or from that of the public at large whose
primary interest is, in such a case, to have the work of government carried on in an orderly fashion, it seems clear that there
is also some soundness in the contention that the state alone should
be permitted to challenge usurpation by officers of powers and
functions of government.
The problem in all of these cases is really one concerning the
effect of an unconstitutional statute. The de facto doctrine is
involved only as a medium whereby to give to an unconstitutional
statute sufficient effect to accomplish the ends of justice and government. All courts seem to agree that the doctrine should be
invoked to give effect to a statute providing for the selection of
officers, even though the statute be invalid. When, however, the
courts have before them a statute which purports to create an
office, they refuse to give it any effect if the enactment is uncoistitutional. For this reason they do not apply the de facto doctrine in such a case. Sometimes this refusal to apply it is due to
the view that an unconstitutional statute is not law, and is to be
given no effect whatever in the disposition of the case. At other
times it is due to the belief that a valid statute is an essential prerequisite to the application of the de facto doctrine.1 3 4 The fact
that some courts have regarded the de facto doctrine as one method whereby to accord some effect to an unconstitutional statute,
and that other courts have looked upon the doctrine as an independent rule or principle, to be applied only in certain situations
in which specified factors are present, has caused a different rule
to be formulated with respect to the situation in which the invalid statute is one purporting to create an office, as compared
with that in which the defective law is one purporting to fill it.
In the greater number of cases reviewed in this study justice
would have been served by giving some effect to the invalid statutes involved. That the decisions in many of them were rendered on the assumption that an invalid statute authorizing the
performance of governmental functions could have no effect was
usually due to a failure to distinguish cause from effect. It may
be that in some classes of cases no effect should be given to an
ll4For attempts to generalize on the cases in terms of the de facto
doctrine see Tooke, De Facto Municipal Corporations Under Unconstitutional Statutes, 37 Yale L. J. 935. Wallach, De Facto Officers,
22 Pol. Sci. Quart. 451, 469.
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unconstitutional statute. If flus be true it should be because
justice is not served by giving the law any effect, and not because of some assumed rule of constitutional law It cannot be
too strongly emphasized that there is no general rule of constitutional law which requires that an unconstitutional statute be given
no effect.13 5
When this is realized and when the courts again have occasion to reconsider the question of attack on official status, the
38
views expressed in State v. Gardner,"
Burt v. Winona & St.
37
Peter R.R.,' and State v. Pouliini' will doubtless gain an increasing number of adherents. The opinion in the latter case
contains the following statement which has already become the
classic brief exposition of the view that official status cannot be
assailed even though the office involved has been created by an
unconstitutional statute -139
"The de facto doctrine is exotic, and was engrafted upon the
law, as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interests
of the public and individuals, where those interests were involved
in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an office
without being lawful officers. It would be unreasonable to require
the public to inquire into the title of an officer, or compel him to
show title, and these have become settled principles in law. To
protect those who deal with officers apparently holding office
under color of law, in such manner as to warrant the public in
assuming that they were officers and in dealing with them as
such, the law validates their acts as to the public and third persons,
on the ground that as to them although not officers de jure they
are officers in fact whose acts public policy requires to be construed as valid. This was not because of any character or quality
conferred upon the officer, or attached to him by reason of any de135For a brief survey of typical situations in which an unconstitutional statute is given some effect, see Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute, 1 Ind. L. J.1, 60 Am. L. Rev. 232, 100 Cent. L. J.
145. For a summary of the various views as to the effect of an unconstitutional statute see the opening paragraphs of Field, The Status
of a Private Corporation Organized Under an Unconstitutional Statute. 17 Cal. L. Rev., (May, 1929).
136(1896) 54 Oh. St. 24, 42 N. E. 999.

137(1884) 31 Minn. 472, 18 N. 'W 283.
138(1909) 105 Me. 224, 74 Atl. 119.
139(1909) 105 Me. 224, 229, 74 At. 119. A note writer in 8 Mich.
L. Rev. 229, 236, says: "It is the writer's opinion that the beneficial
result accomplished by these recent cases will not only justify the
reasons supporting their decision, but also win followers." The note
disapproves the doctrine of the Norton case. The writer argues for a
similar rule with respect to officers as that which obtains in the municipal corporations cases. Cf. Jewell v. Gilbert, (1885) 64 N. H. 13,
5 Atl. 80.
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fective election or appointment, but as a name or character given
to his acts by the law for the purpose of making them valid."
As to the rule with respect to the effect of an unconstitutional
statute, in its bearing on this problem, the court said .140
"Declaring a statute unconstitutional does not necessarily
render it void ab initio. It is an axiom of practical wisdom,
coeval with the development of the common law, founded upon
necessity, that de facto acts of binding force may be performed
under presumption of law There is another rule so uniform in
its application that it, too, has become a legal maxim that 'all acts
of the legislature are presumed to be constitutional.'"
After all, legislative acts are facts, and should be factors in
the decision of a case, even though as law they are not entitled
to full force and effect. People act in reliance on such laws, and
until their unconstitutionality has been judicially declared, those
so relying upon them should be protected.

14

1

1401State v. Poulin, (1909) 105 Me. 224, 228, 74 Atil. 119.
14 The foregoing discussion of the de facto doctrine has not attempted to go beyond the judicial exposition of the doctrine. What
effect such a statute as the following, taken from N. Y Cons. Laws
(Cahill 1923) ch. 41, sec. 1820, following a section making the performance of official duties prior to the taking of oath, or the filing
of required security, a criminal offense, would have, is problematical:
"The last section must not be construed to affect the validity of acts
done by a person exercising the functions of a public office in fact,
where persons other than himself are interested in maintaining the
validity of such acts."

